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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I 
Appellee argues the evidence seized pursuant to the 
invalid warrant would nevertheless be admissible under the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Appellant 
responds to said argument as follows: 
1. Any reliance upon the "good faith exception" as 
enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) was 
first made only on appeal. No argument or any factual 
hearing addressing this issue was submitted to the District 
Court. The State now is precluded from raising the issue on 
appeal. State in the Interest of N.H.B., (Utah App. 1989) 
777 P.2d 487; Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1048 
(Utah App. 1990). 
2. Exclusion is a proper remedy wherein the issuing 
magistrate abandons his judicial role. State v. Leon 468 
U.S. at 927. 
3. The officers herein could not reasonably rely upon a 
warrant based on the affidavit herein which is so lacking in 
the indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence entirely unreasonable. 
4. In State v. Larocco, the Utah Court has held that 
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article I, Section 14 
iii 
is exclusion. State v. Larocco is appropriate precedent 
under state constitutional analysis and mandates that 
exclusion is an appropriate remedy. 
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REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 900246-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYANT COLLARD, 
Appellant/Defendant.) 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for a criminal 
offense of possession of marijuana and possession of 
marijuana without affixing the appropriate stamp, label and 
other indicia of paid taxes required by Section 59-19-101. 
Both offenses are third degree felonies. Proceedings were 
held in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prosecution on this appeal raises the issue of "good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule". The basis of the 
State's argument is that under the principle enunciated in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) evidence, although 
obtained through an invalid warrant, can nevertheless be 
admissible under a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. This new issue is now raised for the first time upon 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not 
properly brought and will not be considered. Wheeler ex rel. 
Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758 (Utah 1988); James v. Preston. 
746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); In the Interest of N.H.B., 777 
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1989). 
The issue of the U.S. v. Leon exception was not raised 
until the filing of appellee's brief. It was not raised in 
the lower court and thereby prejudices the defendant; it 
denies the defendant the opportunity to present evidence or 
argument relating to said issue. 
Fairness precludes that the issue now be raised. 
POINT II 
In United States v. Leon, (1984)468 U.S. 897, 82 L.Ed.2d 
677, 104 S.Ct. 3405, reh den 468 U.S. 1250, 82 L.Ed.2d 942, 
105 S.Ct. 52, the Court held that suppression remains an 
appropriate remedy where the issuing magistrate has wholly 
abandoned his judicial role of neutrality and detachment. 
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In United States v. Guarino, (1984 DC RI) 610 F.Supp. 
371 the District Court held that a warrant failed for the 
lack of probable cause and the lack of particularity. The 
Court held that the required judicial role was never 
exercised by the magistrate issuing the warrant and the 
evidence seized thereunder was thus inadmissible. 
In the present case, the magistrate failed to examine 
the probable cause issue. Affiant officer herein obviously 
camouflaged the information regarding the Collard residence 
and the justification for that search within 53 paragraphs 
dealing with Rex Taylor. Only paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 deal 
with the Collard residence in any form and is so lacking 
regarding probable cause; it mandates a finding that the 
magistrate abandoned his judicial role. 
Upon any reasonable analysis of the information relating 
to the Collard residence, any magistrate would find probable 
case is lacking. Whether fault should be assigned to the 
affiant officer camouflaging said three paragraphs or 
whether the magistrate failed to properly examine the 
probable cause assertions regarding the Collard residence, it 
is obvious that the Court should have denied said petition. 
POINT III 
In United States v. Guarino, Supra., the government's 
attempt to validate a search and seizure on the basis of the 
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exception to the exclusionary rule established in the Leon 
case failed for the reason that the executing officer must 
have an objectively tested belief that the seizure was 
reasonable. The officer's conduct in Guarino could not be 
viewed as objectively reasonable. 
The Court concluded that a suppression of the materials 
in that instant case was to deter unlawful police conduct and 
the exclusion of evidence was justified thereby. 
In United States v. Granger, (1984 W.D. Wis.) 596 
F.Supp. 665, the Court there, knowing that the question of 
good faith was solely whether the affidavit was so lacking in 
the indicia of probable cause that it was unreasonable for 
the FBI agent to rely upon it, concluded that no reasonably 
well-trained law enforcement officer would have been 
justified in relying upon the warrant, knowing, as the agent 
did, of the paucity of information in the affidavit presented 
to the magistrate. 
See also United States v. Freitas, (1985, ND Cal.) 610 
F.Supp. 1560 wherein the Court held that evidence obtained on 
the basis of an invalid warrant should be suppressed. The 
Court noted that the deficiencies in the warrant and the 
affidavit at issue did not turn on subtle inadequacies in the 
probable cause showing or minor transgressions from proper 
search warrant procedure. On the contrary, the Court pointed 
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out, citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, (1984) 468 U.S. 981, 
82 L.Ed.2d 737, 104 S.Ct. 3424 this was the appropriate 
situation in which it was plainly evident that the magistrate 
had no business issuing the warrant. The Court found that 
under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that 
the affidavit contained no provision for notice of any kind 
to the owner or occupants of the dwelling, and the reasons 
offered to justify the search were patently inadequate in 
view of extremely serious intrusion that the search entailed. 
In the present case and setting, the affidavit is 
fatally deficient in supporting any argument for probable 
cause. 
The affiant was also an officer executing the search 
warrant upon the Collard residence. Affiant Nielson alleged 
that the probable cause allegations allegedly justifying a 
search of the Collard residence within 53 paragraphs. With 
the exception of paragraphs 16, 17 and 18, all paragraphs 
deal with Rex Taylor. 
The officer set forth in the warrant that he was 
uncertain as to the location of marijuana, and he advised the 
magistrate within the contents of the Affidavit, that the 
unknown white male turned and walked into one of the houses. 
Not only a statement of uncertainty as to the Collard 
residence, but it is an obvious declaration by the officer 
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that he does not know the whereabouts of the grocery bag 
allegedly containing the marijuana. 
In State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1305, the Utah court 
found, and the State conceded, that the supporting affidavit 
was so lacking in probable cause that it was unreasonable for 
the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely upon warrant. 
It is obvious in this case that the officer's 
declarations within the affidavit advised the Court that he 
does not know the whereabouts of the alleged marijuana. It 
would be completely unreasonable for the officer who prepared 
the affidavit to rely upon the warrant. 
The same officer acting as affiant and as a participant 
in the execution of the warrant merely guessed as to the 
location of the alleged marijuana. 
In Droneburg the affidavit therein sought a no-knock 
warrant to be executed at any time and requested 
authorization for searching of controlled substances and/or 
illegal narcotics at a Panguich residence and the vehicles 
located at that address. The affiant there requested the 
warrant based upon information from a reliable informant. 
Said informant informed the officer that a supply of illegal 
substances were coming in. The officer related that the 
information was reliable because he had used this 
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confidential informant before and had found him to be 
reliable. 
In the present setting, the three paragraphs relating to 
the defendant herein, relate only that Taylor took a 
circuitous route to arrive at 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah; 
that Collard resided there and had convictions for DUI and 
theft (no drug related offenses); and that the officer saw 
the grocery bag delivered to a white male in his twenties who 
then turn and walk into one of the houses. No evidence is 
given to suggest the description of Bryant Collard matched 
this unknown white male in his twenties or otherwise. The 
officer also noted that the unknown white male did not 
necessarily walk into the Collard residence but walk to some 
unknown location. 
POINT IV 
Under state constitutional analysis, Utah courts have 
not recognized the exceptions as granted under United States 
v, Leon to the exclusionary rule. 
In State v. Larocco, (Utah 1990) 135 Utah Adv. Rpts. 16, 
the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
We now expressly hold that exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of Article I, 
Section 14. In reaching this conclusion, we have 
found it useful to examine opinions from other 
state courts. The rule that unlawfully acquired 
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evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials did not 
arise exclusively as a matter of federal 
constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, 
many states have held long before Mapp v. Ohio that 
exclusion was required as a matter of state 
constitutional law when police conduct violated 
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
search and seizure . . . Furthermore, by the time 
Mapp v. Ohio made Weeks v. United States 
exclusionary rule applicable to the states, more 
than half of them were already voluntarily applying 
it . . . At least eighteen states have adopted an 
independent state constitutional exclusionary rule. 
The critical question at this point in the 
history of the federal exclusionary rule is not its 
existence, but rather its nature and scope. The 
United States Supreme Court's holding in Weeks case 
in 1914 strongly suggested that the Court believed 
that the admission of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence was itself unconstitutional and that the 
exclusionary rule was therefore a constitutional 
requirement. Forty-seven years later, Justice 
Harlan, in his dissent in Mapp articulated the 
views that the rule was not a constitutional 
requirement, but rather a judicially created 
remedy, a position taken by the majority of the 
Court thirteen years later in United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra Justice 
Bennett argued in dissent that the rules primary 
objective was not and never had been mere judicial 
deterrence of police conduct. The rule was rather 
a means of enforcement necessary to give content to 
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and 
deterrence was only a secondary benefit. 
Since Calandra the United States Supreme Court 
has, because of the prevailing view on that court 
that the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy and 
not itself a constitutional requirement, created 
several significant exceptions to it. See United 
States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Nicks v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Thus, the 
significant question which must be answered by the 
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state courts considering independent state 
exclusionary rules are "(1) whether the state 
courts consider the exclusionary rule to be a 
constitutional requirement; (2) whether the state 
courts view deterrence as the only purpose behind 
the rule; and (3) which governmental officials are 
deemed to be the target of this deterrence." . . . 
The case before us today does not raise any of 
these questions, nor have they been briefed or 
argued before this court. Wef therefore, say 
nothing about the nature of the exclusionary rule 
(constitutional requirement v. judicial remedy) 
pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, we simply hold that it exists. 
We are persuaded that the exclusion of the VIN 
from evidence in this case might well have changed 
the outcome, although the State had other evidence 
of the theft, the jury might not have found it 
convincing without the VIN. Therefore, we reverse 
and remand this case for a new trial. That result 
makes it unnecessary for us to treat additional 
issues raised in this appeal. 
The defendant argues that the exclusion of the illegally 
obtained evidence as here, is a necessary consequence of 
governmental violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution. Defendant submits that the exclusionary 
rule is still an applicable and appropriate response to a 
violation of Article If section 14. Violations of the 
mandates of Article I, Section 14 state an appropriate 
response of exclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The State argues for the first time on appeal the issue 
presented in United States v. Leon, Supra. Said issue has 
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never been treated by the trial court in any form. No 
presentation of facts or legal arguments have ever been 
presented. The State is precluded from raising said issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
If the Court was to treat the issue of whether exclusion 
would be a proper remedy herein, the defendant submits that 
even under the exceptions granted by State v. Leon, exclusion 
is a proper remedy. Defendant submits that the magistrate 
failed in his role to examine the contents of the affidavit 
and to make appropriate findings as to probable cause. The 
probable cause is so lacking in the present case that this 
Court is bound to find that the magistrate abandoned from his 
constitutionally mandated role. 
Further the officer herein could not, in good faith, 
rely upon the information supplied in the affidavit to 
justify the search pursuant to the warrant. The officer 
camouflaged three paragraphs dealing with the Collard 
residence in an affidavit of 53 paragraphs. The officer 
advises the Court in the affidavit that he is not familiar 
with any facts which attributes the location of the alleged 
marijuana to the Collard residence. He advises the Court 
particularly that he lacks information as to the location of 
the marijuana. 
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The Utah Courts have recognized that the exclusionary 
rule is an appropriate remedy to the violation of Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. Utah Court in 
State v. Larocco, supra, expressly held that the exclusion of 
the illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of 
police violations of Article I, Section 14. Even if the 
State was to succeed upon the arguments of State v. Leon, 
State v. Larocco mandates that the evidence be excluded under 
state constitutional analysis. 
DATED this ^ day of JJc^^ , 1991. 4 
SHELDENf R CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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